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Introduction
Although controversial, it is quite possible that, at least under certain circumstances, the fighting effectiveness of a conscript army can equal that of a professional army. For any army, fighting effectiveness is not only influenced by the degree of psychological cohesion among soldiers and officers, but also by the organizational culture of each particular service unit towards the preparation for war and the waging of the conflict itself. The Malvinas/Falklands War of 1982 is an example of this situation. 1 In this war, two different types of armies confronted one another: the British army, a professional and all volunteer force, and the Argentine army comprised principally of conscripted soldiers. In this regard, some analysts assert that the British concept was vindicated when a force of British professional soldiers defeated an opposing Argentine force of draftees twice as numerous. 2 Now more than a decade and a half after the conflict has ended, with an extensive new literature beginning to emerge, this common assumption needs to be subjected to closer scrutiny. For example, analysts in general have rated the capabilities of the Argentine land forces as poor, although there were exceptions and some units performed very well. These cases deserve further study. While the British sent most of their elite troops, such as Commandos, Paratroopers, and Special Forces, the Argentine High Command sent troops to the islands that were neither the elite units nor those best suited for the Malvinas theater of operations. Instead, the elite units of the Argentine Army waited idly on the mainland in order to respond to any possible Chilean movement there.
Under such circumstances, without the proper training and equipment, the conscripted Argentine soldiers had to fight not only against the enemy but also against the lack of foresight of their own High Command. Nevertheless, even though some Argentine units surrendered without firing a shot, other engagements were hotly and quite effectively contested. The reasons for such differences in behavior beg for analysis, especially in the light of recently available Argentine sources. 3 Notably, the most effective Argentine effort came from some small Army units and one Navy unit, the 5 th Marine Battalion. For these units, two primary causes account for the differences in fighting performance. First, small Army groups fought well because there was cohesion among their components (conscripts, noncommissioned officers, and junior officers). Secondly, in the case of the Marine battalion, its performance was the product not only of good training and better cohesion, but also of the different institutional approach to the means of waging war that the Argentine Navy employed. By focusing upon these units and their effectiveness, a rather striking picture of the Malvinas War comes to light that differs quite substantially from those drawn in the immediate aftermath of the war itself. It should also make us rethink the "lessons" of the war, including those that surround the professionals versus conscripts controversy.
Military Service and Fighting Performance
In order to provide the manpower for its armed forces, each country must adopt particular policies in regard to military service. In this respect, the Malvinas War of 1982 initially caught the attention of military analysts because its combatants represented the two most common systems of manpower allocation. On one side, Argentina went to war with a cadre/conscript system; on the other, Great Britain waged the war with a professional army. 4 According to Cohen, in the professional services, officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) are long-service soldiers, and the rank and file sees military service as a career. With the exception of short periods for World Wars II and II, 5 the British have adopted this system from the Eighteen Century to the present. In contrast, the cadre/conscript system often inducts draftees for periods of twelve to thirty-six months to serve in the military, in units staffed primarily by professional NCOs and officers. The system foresees that some of the junior leadership must come from the ranks of conscripts; nonetheless, in most cadre/conscripts systems, leadership rests in the hands of a professional elite. 6 Men are drafted at a fixed age (anywhere from eighteen to twenty-one), although some may have their service deferred. 7 This pattern held true for Argentine during most of the twentieth century. From 1901 to 1996, Argentina required universal military service for all males. 8 After 1976, eighteenyear-olds were inducted into service. Of the total available pool, some received exemptions on the basis of being unable to meet physical requirements or having dependency considerations. The total number of conscripts was then determined by the current training budget. All males of the total pool were assigned by lottery to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, and the conscripts served for only one year. 9 The principal advantages of such a conscript system are, first, that it provides a large standing force of young men. Second, as soon as conscripts finish their period of active duty, they became part of a reserve. Third, the system provides the state with substantial, immediately usable forces, at a fairly cheap cost. 10 Finally, it provides a state with the means for quick mobilization in wartime. 11 On strictly military terms, the contrast between a professional and a conscript army also affects the capacity of the armed forces of a country to wage war, and the effectiveness of the two systems depends partly on the kind of war that the armed forces are required to fight. According to Cohen, different kinds of wars, small or large, challenge states with different political and military requirements. For small wars, he argues that a smaller, lightly equipped, professional force seems best. On the contrary, for large wars, a mechanized, conscript force is often assumed to offer better hope for success.
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Because these requirements differ, it may be that the army suited for one kind of war will find itself at a disadvantage in the other. 13 Small wars are often long and seemingly inconclusive, waged far from home, in inhospitable regions, against seemingly invisible enemies, and without great public support.
14 Although waged very close to the Argentine mainland, the Malvinas War should still be classified, in the view of most analysts, as a small war. 15 In this case, they contend, the outcome of the confrontation was predetermined against Argentina.
In the face of such pessimistic conclusions, however, it must be noted that the historical performance of conscript armies shows that distinctions between short-service conscripts and volunteer professionals may be reduced or even disappear in wartime. 16 Moreover, it is recognized that improving the training and the quality of the officer corps also may reduce or even erase the differences between conscripts and volunteer professional soldiers. 17 This means that it is possible to improve the fighting capabilities of the conscripts so that they approach to the standards of a professional force.
The Lessons of the Malvinas War
Despite this literature on the potential of conscript armies, a general consensus formed after 1982 that the Malvinas War demonstrated the advantage of highly professional, volunteer forces for fighting sudden, small wars in remote parts of the world. 18 In this case, "the British concept seemed to be vindicated in the course of the 1982 war, when a force of some 5,000 British professional soldiers routed a force of Argentine draftees nearly twice as numerous". 19 In this particular case, the United States Marine Corps also interpreted the war as the triumph of long-service British regulars against short-service Argentine conscripts. 20 For example, Cohen assumes that the British success was predetermined, because the Argentine conscripts were poorly led and trained and because "many of the best Argentine troops . . . [were] retained to guard the Chilean border". 21 Moreover, as others have noted, unlike the British forces, only few Argentine units had received training in night fighting and in cold weather operations. 22 Others have attributed the Argentine defeat to the lack of military cohesion. In this case, the key to British success was their advantage in training, stamina, and leadership, which produced a highly cohesive force. 23 Combat cohesion, defined as "a special bonding which implies that men are willing to die for the preservation of the group, or the code of honor of the group, or the valor and honor of the country," can act as a "force multiplier". 24 At moments, survival and victory depend on the intense cooperation of all ranks during combat. More broadly, cohesion comprises horizontal bonding, vertical bonding and organizational bonding. 25 In this same line of criticism, some observers point to the poor motivation of the Argentine conscripts. 26 A direct British participant in the war reportedly said that the Argentines' weakness "even before we had attacked [was] that they did not really want to fight. They were not 100 percent behind their government's action in the Falklands. All this crap about being educated from birth about the 'Malvinas'. If they were that committed, why didn't they fight for it?" 27 According to this critical view, then, the experience of the Malvinas War demonstrated that, first, professional armies are better suited than conscript armies to fight small wars. Second, the common assumption has been that Argentine land forces were no match for the British, because they lacked cohesion, were poorly trained, had inadequate leadership and were poorly motivated. If so, any lay observer could come to believe that the fighting in the islands was easy and light. In contrast to these assumptions, however, some Argentine units fought well, and at times the battle on the ground was effectively contested. Therefore, we need to explore the reasons for such good performance by some Argentine units in some detail.
Reassessing the Argentine Effort
Despite the general assertions about the poor performance of the Argentine land forces during the war in the South Atlantic, several accounts present a more balanced viewpoint. For example, Nora Stewart, an American scholar who studied the combat cohesiveness of the two armies, maintains that "the Argentines fought well and bravely in many parts of the islands. Not all. But many." Importantly she ads "those Argentine groups . . . are more interesting than those who did run away". 28 If we follow this line of analysis, two engagements particularly stand out as examples of hard fought battles: Goose Green and Mount Tumbledown. For Goose Green, a British source states that "the enemy positions had turned out to be very well sited and stoutly defended" 29 and that the Argentines "had been shown to be able to fight a great deal better than had been suggested". 30 Mount Tumbledown was part of the defensive ring around Puerto Argentino, the capital of the Malvinas Islands, and it has been described as part of "those areas of the battlefield where British troops fought professional and well -trained Argentine groups . . . English units like [the] Welsh and Scots Guards paid a high price [for capturing this position]". 31 The fact that Mount Tumbledown "fell only after fierce fighting" underscored "the spottiness in the quality of Argentine troop performance and the inability of the British to predict what kind of resistance they might expect in any given action". 32 Similarly, Julian Thompson, the commanding officer of the 3 rd Commando Brigade, challenged any assertion to the contrary when he contented that " on Mount Harriet, as elsewhere, the Argentine officers and senior NCOs fought hard". 33 Therefore, it is necessary to look at these engagements in some detail, especially as reflected in the perceptions of those who fought in them.
Goose Green: The Preparation for Battle
The Darwin and Goose Green isthmus is a low area of the islands, about ten kilometers long, in the south about five kilometers wide. It provides the only land link between the north of Soledad Island (East Falkland) and the southern part of it (Lafonia). The northern limits are between Low Pass and the Burntside Pond. A deep fiord, Bodie Creek, which penetrates the land from east to west, establishes the southern limit. A spine running NNE-SSW along its center dominates the isthmus, and a thick gorse-line divides it in half from the ruined Boca House to the hilltop (Darwin Hill) overlooking Darwin settlement. Precarious tracks link the three main areas of habitationBurntside House in the northeast, Darwin settlement on the East Coast halfway down the isthmus, and Goose Green settlement towards the south, also on the East Coast. From the airstrip to the north, one can see the settlement.
34 Map 1 shows the location of the different reference points of Darwin-Goose Green isthmus. The Argentines named the small landing strip "Cóndor" Air Base, and Air Force personnel manned it for air defense and airplane servicing, defending it with six 20mm antiaircraft guns. The Darwin settlement consisted of six houses, and in Goose Green there were fifteen houses.
On April 4th, the first Argentine garrison arrived at Goose Green. rd Infantry Brigade, the last major combat unit to be sent to the Malvinas, and much of its heavy, support, and communication equipment never arrived. 37 Three quarters of the force consisted of conscripts with an average time under the colors of no more than six months, and their level of instruction and training was deficient. 38 The Regiment's commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Italo Piaggi, declared that most of the conscripts were from the class of 1963 with only thirty days of military instruction. 39 At the beginning of the battle, the support weapons available to the defenders were three 105mm howitzers, three 105mm recoilless guns, one 120mm mortar, two 81mm mortars, ten heavy machine guns (MAGs), and one heavy 0.5 machine gun. 40 There were also six 20mm antiaircraft guns and two 35mm antiaircraft guns. Originally sited to protect the airfield from air raids, these weapons were employed later in the ground defense role.
During the period between the Argentine occupation and the beginning of the combat, the Argentine soldiers were occupied in numerous activities. Principally, they dug foxholes, prepared positions, and cleaned their armament. 41 To prepare their combat positions the units had very few shovels, as there was the provision of only one large shovel per platoon. 42 After the fighting, Conscript Walter Donado (C Company of the 25 th IR) explained the situation quite candidly:
Stone, rock, pure stone, deadly. Up higher it was easy because of the peat, but right away the stone came up. And right there, with a shitty little shovel, I started to dig. If it took me two and a half days to dig my little foxhole, how could the English build an aluminum airstrip with hangers and everything in two and half-hours? Something went wrong . . . They had machines, they had everything. I don't know where they got them. So I wondered, how was I going to win the war with my little shovel?" 43 During those days the soldiers had to cope with the intense cold, as well as with isolation and an anxiety generated by the lack of news from outside. 44 Other "enemies" that the participants constantly mention when they look back were the intense darkness, the tendency to sleep, and the boredom. 45 In this context, a priority for the officers was to get to know their men and to prepare them to fight. Second Lieutenant Juan José Gómez Centurión remembers that "during those days, we talked a lot with the soldiers, trying to get the cohesion that the units would need in a combat situation." During the bombardments, Second Lieutenant [Roberto] Estévez and other officers stood outside the foxholes while all the soldiers and the NCOs were in them. Nobody could get out. There was also another lieutenant or second lieutenant, I don't re member, Reyes. The guy seemed to be crazy, he shouted, and told dirty jokes. By doing that, he gave us a lot of courage. 47 Shortages of weapons and men were not Piaggi's only difficulty. His original task  to protect the two settlements and the airfieldentailed a defensive perimeter of 17 kilometers, with the main emphasis on countering a landing from the sea. But, after the British landings at San Carlos, Piaggi was ordered to extend his defenses farther northwards and to prepare to face a land attack from San Carlos. Piaggi's men, who had earlier constructed a strong defense line approximately halfway up the isthmus protected by minefields, now had to move beyond the minefields and construct new defenses. His second perimeter was now 31 kilometers long. 48 Thus, the Argentine forces had to fight on an overextended perimeter.
The Battle of Goose Green
The British troops began the seaborne assault on the Malvinas during the night of May 20-21, in San Carlos, at the northeast corner of Soledad Island (East Falkland). The landing was nearly unopposed. They met resistance from a token force (the Güemes Team), which immediately pulled back, abandoning its heavy equipment.
The British High Command, wanting to engage the Argentines as soon as possible, ordered the Second Parachute Battalion to move south and recapture the Darwin and Goose Green settlements. For the operation, they had naval artillery support from the frigate HMS Arrow. 49 British Harriers also constantly bombed the Argentine positions, and, during the fight, Argentine airplanes from the Air Force and the Navy also bombed the British. Despite these efforts, however, the battle became a classic infantry engagement.
To the north, the Argentines had advanced a scout platoon one kilometer north of Camilla Creek. During part of May 27 th the British paratroopers examined the terrain for night fighting, and at that time there were skirmishes and patrol engagements between both forces. The Scout Platoon of the 12 th IR had been deployed three kilometers north of the main line of defense, and its A Company was assigned to defend the zone of Low PassBurntside House. 50 A general British advance down the mile-wide neck of the isthmus commenced at 2:30 a.m. local time on Friday, May 28 th .51 Conscript Esteban Bustamante (Scout Platoon, 12 th IR) described this first encounter:
They attacked us on May 27 th . We began to see the English, who were coming from the north in columns . . . Night was falling, but we sent up flares and you could see like day ... The next day, as it began to get light, they started to get close, and we saw them at about two hundred meters . . . Now there was artillery firing on both sides . . . and the corporal said: fire, fire, they're coming on top of us.
Bustamante was later captured.
A Company of the 12 th IR defended the attacked sector with two platoons (about 104 men) under First Lieutenant Antonio Manresa. This was the area in which the Argentines had been ordered to extend their defense positions a few days earlier. 53 The attacking B Company of the Second Parachute Battalion encountered no mines as it moved to the top of the neck of the isthmus. In the ensuing action, about nine Argentines were killed. It was not possible to tell the exact number, owing to the effect of the burning white phosphorous in the dugouts. 54 In this situation, Middlebrook described the first proper action between formed units of the two adversaries as a fight between one of the most aggressive and skillful battalions of the British army and a typical Argentine unit based on the conscript system. 55 One by one, the Argentine posts were eliminated, or the defenders fell back. The action lasted until first light, and Manresa's men did at least stop the British advance from reaching Goose Green by daylight. 56 59 Estévez had no time to counter-attack, however, because, as his platoon advanced, he met the remnants of A Company and immediately afterward encountered the first British troops. Now three platoons and possibly thirty or forty more men who had fallen back from the earlier fighting defended the line. They had no support from the artillery and no mortar bombs, so that the coming fight would be purely a clash of light-infantry weapons. 60 Conscript Guillermo Huircapán (C of Company, 25 th IR) described the action:
Lieutenant Estévez went from one side to the other organizing the defense until all at once they got him in the shoulder. But with that and everything, badly wounded, he kept crawling along the trenches, giving orders, encouraging the soldiers, asking for everyone. A little later they got him in the side, but just the same, from the trench he continued directing the artillery fire by radio. There was a little pause and then the English began the attack again, trying to advance, and again we beat them off...The English threw colored smoke bombs and in the middle of the smoke and confusion we saw that some of our comrades had begun to surrender, because they had no more ammunition. 61 The fighting here resulted in a partial reversal for the British. As British paratroopers advanced to Darwin Hill, the men of the Estévez platoon caught them in the open. The British suffered several casualties and went to ground. They attempted an attack on the hill, but the Argentines had the ground well covered, and killed three paratroopers. 62 British field commanders also recognized that the previous reports about a demoralized and unmotivated garrison were inaccurate. 63 Surprisingly, the same Major Keeble who had said that the Argentines were not motivated to fight now testified "all this [is] rubbish about them not wanting to fight, they were fighting hard". 64 During this action on Darwin Hill, the commanding officer of the Second Parachute Battalion, LieutenantColonel Jones, was killed when he attempted a solo attack on the Argentine trenches. 65 The advance ran out of steam at Darwin Hill. At 8:30 that morning, the paratroopers' position was unenviable, as none of their rifle companies could break through the open ground and end the deadlock that the Argentines had imposed. 66 When the paratroopers resumed the assault, they worked round to the right (from the British side) of the Argentine position. With the help of 66-mm anti-tank rocket launchers, the British took one trench after another in an action depicted as "a slow work and hard fighting". 67 According to a British author, Lt. Estévez's platoon "fought well". He was hit three times and died, while only three or four men from his platoon escaped back to Goose Green. 68 The stalemate lasted until 1 p.m. Although the area was still shelled and mortared, the British finally took Darwin Hill.
At the Boca House position, Aliaga's platoon also stopped the British advance. The British suffered casualties here as well, and the paratroopers were forced to pull back. 69 Later, D Company of the Second Parachute Battalion outflanked the position, and the defenders were caught between its fire and that of B Company.
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During the fighting, Aliaga was wounded in the neck, many soldiers were wounded, and one Argentine NCO and four conscripts were killed. With no chance for a breakout, and out of ammunition, they surrendered. from the north, and the forces clashed. 76 They fought between 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Gómez Centurión described the action in the following terms:
I set out with thirty-six men toward the north. Passing the school, we entered a depression from which we saw the hill . . . I sent a scouting party ahead, and they told me that the British were advancing from the other side of the low ridge, some one hundred and fifty men . . . [My] men were very tense, there was a ferocious cold, we shivered with cold, with fear . . . When they were about fifty meters away, we opened fire . . . We kept firing for at least forty minutes . . . They started to attack our flank, my soldiers had to take cover, the firing went down, and the situation started to become critical. Then we were surrounded, we had wounded, people started to lose control . . . I began to ask about casualties, each time more casualties. There was no way out behind, because we had been flanked, nearly surrounded . . . So when there was a pause in the firing I decided that it was the time to stop, and I gave the order to disengage. 77 The British gradually gained the upper hand in the fighting. But, as Frost recognizes, C and D Companies were suffering casualties now. Once again the white phosphorus grenades proved most effective in helping men to get close to the enemy, and gradually the paratroopers cleared the positions. 78 Clive Livingstone described that the combination of artillery, mortar, machine-gun and antiaircraft guns into which C Company advanced towards the Goose Green schoolhouse as "terrifying." 79 As the paratroopers captured the Schoolhouse position, most of the Argentines began to retreat to Goose Green, while, at the same time, small groups were surrendering from outlying positions around the edge of the airfield.
80 Gómez Centurión's platoon suffered twenty casualties, of which seven were dead. The Argentines were pushed back to the last line of defense. At 12:25 p.m., Piaggi received orders from Puerto Argentino to counterattack, but he had no means available to comply with the order. 81 The British had reached the very last defenses around Goose Green settlement by 5:00 p.m. B Company of the Second Parachute Battalion had completed its long encircling move, and the paratroopers had taken up positions immediately southwest of the settlement. 82 At 5:20 p.m., Argentine helicopters arrived unexpectedly and landed troops at a position about three miles south of Goose Green. Captain Eduardo Corsiglia commanded this group known as Task Group Solari, about 140 strong. 83 As the men landed, they were shelled by enemy artillery. They had no radios, so that they could not contact the commanding officer in Goose Green to assess the situation and receive further orders. Later in the night, Task Group Solari found a gap in the British ring and came into the settlement. At about midnight, Captain Corsiglia appeared at Piaggi's headquarters. 84 According to Argentine sources, the scene was one of absolute disorganization. Soldiers were hanging around without direction, looking like "zombies". 85 At that moment, Piaggi recognized that the men under his command were dispirited because of the high casualties and their weariness. 86 Now Chris Keeble could take stock of the situation. He had the Argentines bottled up in the settlement, with his own companies on the higher ground above the settlement. 
Assessment of the Battle
One important lesson of this battle and of the campaign more generally was that it was possible to fight outnumbered and to win. 88 In this case, the most extreme estimate claims that in Goose Green, 450 paratroopers defeated 1,600 Argentines. 89 If true, the paratroopers defeated a force three and a half time larger. At the end of the battle, the British claimed that they captured more than 1,000 prisoners, although, depending on the source, that number has fluctuated between 1,200 and 1,600. The British reported Argentine casualties as high as 250 dead. 90 The numbers of British casualties reported, sources agree, were 15 paratroopers dead and between 30 to 40 wounded.
On the other hand, the Official Argentine Army Report states that the total number of soldiers present at Darwin Goose Green area on May 27 th was 981. 91 The commanding officer of the Task Force, Lt. Col. Piaggi, reported that on the same date, the number of his soldiers present in the area was 684, and, when considering the reinforcement sent in by helicopters, the final number of his forces reached the 790. 92 Cervo points out that the total Argentine army troops present in the area at the beginning of the fighting was 643 and that the final total count never exceeded 881. In addition, Air force personnel numbered 202. 93 The official number of Argentine fatalities was 47, with 98 wounded. 94 In his book of 1989, The Fight for the 'Malvinas', Martin Middlebrook notes that the Argentines comprised 630 soldiers, not counting reinforcements. 95 These numbers tell an important story. When the numbers of Argentine defenders are compared to the 450 British paratroopers, the British success can not be seen as crushing. For political reasons, both parties have incentives to increase their adversary's numbers, while at the same time decreasing their own, as a way to highlight the efforts and the effectiveness of their own forces.
In fact, the battle for Goose Green was highly contested. Both sides recognized the capacity of the enemy to inflict damage. The British paratroops were a highly prepared military force and it was expected they would perform well. They carried out orders efficiently, fought tenaciously, and were able to adapt rapidly to the conditions of the theater of operations. Conversely, Argentine forces lacked many of the basic elements needed to prepare soldiers to confront combat situations. Their logistics were appalling; their training was in many cases incomplete or deficient; and their armament was at times defective. At the tactical level, because of the lack of tools, the Argentine units had to improvise in order to dig in and fight, and, for this reason, their efforts looked uncoordinated. But under these severe restrictions, the men of Task Force Mercedes fought gallantly as well. The degree of success that Estevéz in Darwin Hill, Gómez Centurión in the Schoolhouse and Aliaga in Boca House had reflects the work of the junior officers, NCOs and numerous conscripts.
These men created enough cohesion to confront adversity. Finally, the faults were on the shoulders of the Argentine High Command, both at the operational and the strategic levels.
Mount Tumbledown: Preparation for Battle
On April 8th, the commanding officer of the 5th Marine Battalion, Commander Carlos Robacio, received orders to go to the Malvinas. Until April 12th, personnel and equipment arrived at Puerto Argentino. Once the unit was totally in place, the High Command ordered its members to prepare defensive positions around the capital. More precisely, the 5th Marine Battalion was responsible for Mount Tumbledown, Mount William, and Sapper Hill. The battalion had to cover a perimeter of 16 kilometers. To accomplish this, the battalion had a total force of 703 men. All conscripts, the Marines were from the class 1962 or older, and no new conscripts (class of 1963) were sent to the islands. The battalion was far from complete, since only the rifle companies, the headquarters unit, and a few logistical units entered the islands. Later, other Marine units would reinforce the battalion, including a group of heavy machine-guns (some 29 men, with 0.5 caliber machinegun), the First Platoon of Marine Amphibious Engineers (20 men), and B Battery of the Marine Field Artillery Battalion with six 105mm guns. 96 Originally, the machine-gun group belonged to a Marine Machine-gun Company hastily assembled in Puerto Belgrano, the principal Argentine naval base. This company, some 136 strong, had a total of 27 guns and was divided into three platoons. When the company arrived in the islands, its platoons were dispersed, and the Marine Battalion used only one. 97 The rifle companies were M Company (203 men), N Company (200 men), and the O Company (100 strong). 98 As to what to defend most strongly, the Argentine General High Command in the Malvinas decided to defend three "key" zones: Puerto Argentino (Port Stanley), the capital of the islands; Darwin-Goose Green on Soledad Island (East Falkland); and, for political reasons, Fox Bay and Port Howard on Gran Malvina Island (West Falkland). Map 2 shows the location of the Argentine key defense zones in the Malvinas Islands. 99 All the Army units rushed to the islands without their heavy and support equipment. For instance, they lacked sufficient field kitchens, winter clothing, communication equipment, or even spare batteries to properly support the troops.
Unlike their Army brothers, the Argentine Marines were well fed, and they had good clothing and improved communications equipment. Also unlike the Army conscript soldiers, the Marines had undergone night combat training, and, principally because the battalion had been based in Tierra del Fuego in the far south of Patagonia, its members were adapted to the rigorous climatic conditions. 100 During the period between their arrival and the fighting, the Marines were kept busy preparing their positions, digging bunkers, cleaning their equipment, and reconnoitering the terrain and coordinating and organizing fire support. 101 The battalion was also well provided with entrenching tools. Because of their experience in Tierra del Fuego, they were well aware of the hardness of the soil of the islands surrounding Argentina. Therefore, the battalion flew to the islands provided with iron bars, which were very useful for digging in the rocks.
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The actual combat between Argentine and British forces begun on May 1 st with the bombardment of the airport by a Vulcan bomber of the RAF. The British then harassed the Argentine garrison, using continuous naval and aerial bombardment, as well as small-scale commando raids. Every night after May 1 st , two or three British vessels bombarded the south coast of Puerto Argentino from 12 to 15 kilometers out at sea. 103 After the British landings in San Carlos, the General High Command in the islands rearranged the defensive perimeter. Initially the commanders had expected the most probable direction of attack to be from the sea, with the British landing troops in Puerto Argentino or its surroundings. But later, those in charge decided to defend Puerto Argentino also from an attack from the west, while maintaining strong coastal defenses to the east and south of the capital.
Between May 29 th and June 3 rd , the High Command established the western side of the defensive perimeter along the mounts that surrounded Puerto Argentino. These ran from north to south, and they comprised Wireless Ridge, Longdon, Dos Hermanas (Two Sisters), Harriet, Tumbledown, William, and Sapper Hill. This new perimeter was 48 kilometers long, and the Argentine forces could guard only 37 per cent of it. This meant that there was enough space left uncovered that the enemy could take advantage of the gaps and infiltrate the Argentine positions. 104 Map 3 shows Puerto Argentino, its surrounding heights and the Marine positions around Mount Tumbledown.
After the fall of Goose Green, the British troops movedsome chroniclers say "yomped" west toward Puerto Argentino, 105 At about 11:00 p.m., local time, the British attacked simultaneously all along the western front. The attackers outnumbered the Argentine defenders by two to one. 106 The British were using all of their available forces in the attack on Puerto Argentino; there were no more fresh troops in reserve and no more under way from Great Britain. Also, as Middlebrook notes, the British troops were tiring and were suffering, as were the Argentines, from the increasingly cold weather. Assuming that the British would take one position at a time and then consolidate it, the Marines tried, as their basic strategy, to hold their positions until dawn. They expected the British to withdraw if they failed to capture these positions. 112 The first action was a diversionary attack carried out by about thirty guardsmen of the Headquarters Company, supported by four light tanks. This was the first tank operation in the Malvinas Islands. The attack was aimed to attract the Argentine forces towards Mount William, and the British column engaged the southernmost elements of the O Company of the 5th Marines, which had been sent forward near Pony Pass. 113 The British advanced while there was still some light, so that the Argentines could clearly identify the attacking force and its composition. 114 According to the officer commanding O Company, the British were unaware of the presence of the Argentine force. The Argentine officer in charge fixed the position of the attackers and directed the artillery fire, which rained down on the Scots. 115 This initial exchange ended favorably for the Argentines, as the guards pulled back, believing that they had accomplished the diversion. But no Argentine reserves moved to that sector, 116 In order to stop the British, nearly all of N Company was concentrated on the eastern end of the ridge, deployed to dominate the open ground to the north and the south 124 . This left only the 4 th Platoon, led by Second Lieutenant Carlos Vázquez, to receive the full attack of the Scots Guards. Moreover, this was not even a regular platoon, as it has been made up from Marines spared from other duties. The platoon comprised twenty-seven Marines, plus a few Marine engineers, and sixteen Army soldiers.
125
The British used profusely rocket fire, but the Marines' positions had been well prepared, and the men resisted. As the night wore on and the fierce firefight continued, the Argentines showed no sign of crumbling, and their main positions held firm. They brought down mortar fire on their attackers. 126 According to Vázquez, during the first attacks it appeared that the Scots were overconfident, but later they changed their tactics. 127 At about 1:00 a.m. on June 14th, with the Scots Guards occupying positions among the Argentine foxholes, the Argentine officer in charge requested supporting fire over his own positions. After a hail of fire and after being caught in the open, the Scots withdrew to their rear and to higher ground. Then, at 2:00 a.m., the Scots Guards reassumed the attack against the 4 th Platoon, this time more violently. They charged on up the hill, began to assault the Marines' positions from several directions at once, and took them one by one. 131 At about 4:30 a.m., after the machine guns of the 4 th Platoon began to run out of ammunition, Vázquez saw that the Argentines were losing control of the situation, as the British were occupying the foxholes, killing their original occupants. 132 Once again, Vázquez asked for artillery fire over his position and this time the Marines' 105mm howitzers pounded the area. At about 5:00 a.m., the British initiated the third assault on the platoon's foxholes. At 7:00 a.m., only three foxholes rema ined in the hands of the Marines. Finally, with the ammunition nearly gone, Lieutenant Vázquez decided to surrender. Of the 36 men originally in the platoon, 12 were killed, four missing, and five wounded. 133 By the time that the Scots Guards finally captured the crest of the mount, their Left Flank Company lost also seven killed and twenty-one wounded. 134 The third phase of the battalion's attack began at 6 a.m. This time, the Right Flank Company followed up the advance of the Left Flank Company, with its First Platoon taking positions as high up in the rocks to the left as possible in order to provide fire support. This put the Argentine defendersa platoon of B Company of the 6 th IR under crossfire. 135 After what one participant described as a further " six hours of struggle inch by inch up the rocks, using phosphorous grenades and automatic weapons" in order to force the Argentines out from their positions, the Scots Guards sized Tumbledown. 136 They occupied their objective eleven hours after crossing the Start Line, 137 and their casualties numbered 9 dead and 41 wounded. Some of the survivors of Vázquez's platoon retreated in the direction of Puerto Argentino.
This stiff resistance from the Marines upset the British timetable and caused the postponement of the Gurkhas' attack on Mount William. 138 At 139 M Company, which up to now had only received the attention of the British naval artillery, was positioned to receive the retreating Marines. 140 The pullback of the Battalion, which was accomplished under constant bombardment, was orderly and according to regulations. 141 At 9:30 a.m. June 14 th , the fighting stopped and a cease-fire came into force.
Assessment of the Battle
At the end of the battle, the 5 th Marines had suffered a total of 61 casualties: 16 dead and 45 wounded. 142 The Scots Guards recognize nine of their number killed and 41 wounded. 143 Nevertheless, while Argentine casualties thus marginally outweighed the British, British sources still acknowledge that the fighting was fierce at Tumbledown. On that mount, as the Sunday Times explained to its readers, "the Scots Guards were to face the toughest action of all. There a well trained Argentinian marine battalion was heavily dug into a series of intricate bunkers, cut in the rock . . . The firepower of the marines was intense and impressive." 144 The Argentine 5th Marines stayed together as a team and behaved cohesively, both before and after their surrender. 145 According to Lieutenant-Colonel N. Vaux, the commanding officer of the 42 nd Marine Commandos, the Argentine Marines marched smartly, holding their regimental colors high as they marched along the streets of Port Stanley. The British wanted to capture their regimental flag, but "to the Royal Marines' chagrin, the Argentine Marines poured gasoline on their flags and burned them to ashes before the eyes of their enemies." 146 A publication of the Argentine Army also explicitly assessed the reasons for the superior performance of the 5th Marine Battalion:
[They] possessed a well-balanced set of weapons, and excellent communication equipment. But much more important, because of the Navy's particular draft system, they had enough trained soldiers adapted from peacetime to the terrain and the extreme weather conditions . . . At the same time, the Navy's excellent logistic support system ... could sustain the outstanding fighting performance. 147 Certainly in the experience of this unit there were lessons, both for the Argentine military and also for all whom want to learn from the experience of the Malvinas War.
Conclusions
From this analysis of the actual fighting of the Malvinas War, the idea that the professional British Army defeated the concept of a conscript army has to be qualified in significant degree. The battle of Goose Green showed how a group of conscript soldiers could fight effectively when they have capable leadership from their junior officers. In this case, cohesion was generated through the key role of military leaders. 148 Moreover, the Argentine Marines, which were not an elite force, also showed what conscript soldiers can do when they are well equipped, trained and led. In this case, the Argentine Marines were better prepared to cope with the emergency and to fight this small war. Their institution had provided them with the tools and the capabilities to perform well under combat conditions.
149
The official account of the Argentine Commission of Inquiry for the Malvinas War, Rattenbach Report, underscored the contrast in institutional approaches to war that the Argentine services personified so clearly in the Malvinas:
The 5th Marine Battalion demonstrated teamwork, spirit, and higher levels of training, professionalism and adequate equipment. These aptitudes were shown in the land fighting during the defense of Puerto Argentino. In this action, the unit established an outstanding performance. 150 On the contrary, when the Argentine Army confronted an unexpected war situation, its soldiers were not adequately trained and prepared to wage a war of the magnitude and characteristics of the South Atlantic conflict, especially against an enemy highly experienced and superior in military power. 151 In this case, as Steward wrote, "the Argentine Army did not train its men or prepare them for the battle ahead." 152 In the final hours of the conflict, as a consequence of the lack of cohesion of some Army units retreated disorderly and the number of conscripts that run away in direction of Puerto Argentino. 153 Another institutional feature that distinguished these services, the Army and the Navy, was the system of inducting conscripts. The Navy arranged to draft new recruits bimonthly in five successive rotations, which helped to maintain enough veteran conscripts during the full year. 154 The Marine conscripts served a fixed time of 14 months. Conversely, as Stewart also observed:
The fluctuating numbers for the Army depend on the number of conscripts inducted each year and on what date in any one of the three training cycles one measures the Army's size. Conscripts are inducted in March; the traini ng cycle closes in October; a portion of the class is released in November, others in December and January, and the final group after the induction of the new class in March. Therefore, some conscripts serve as few as eight months and others their full twelve-month commitment. Thus the lowest number of men in the Army is between January and March (summer)." 155 In this case, the organizational culture of the Argentine Army and Navy was the critical variable. This culture defined the set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that in turn shaped the ways in which the soldiers and Marines behaved collectively. 156 Finally, the Malvinas case was also a typical example of "combined failure," in which the Argentine High Command failed to anticipate the British reaction and to adapt to the combat conditions 157 . Argentina was playing a dangerous game without a contingency plan in case the British accepted the gauntlet thrown down and decided to send troops to the South Atlantic. As both the broader issues of the Malvinas War and the actual strategies for fighting it demonstrate, the full responsibility for the Argentine debacle lay, mainly, on the shoulders of the High Command and the Theater Command. 158 The tactical commands did what they could with the elements provided for them.
